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September, 30, 1985 Conference 
List 11, Sheet 1 
No. 84-1656 ~ 
LOCAL 28, SHEET MET~-·~-, Q .. Cert to CA2 (Pratt, 
WORKERS' INT'L AS~ ~ Mansfield: Winter--dissent) 
v. ~peL 
EEOC  Fed./Civ. Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs contend that the district court 
exceeded its Title VII remedial powers by imposing an 
affirmative action plan on them containing ri id goals or 
~~at ca~_!__ be j~stified as a legitimate remedy for 
their past violations of Title VII. 




2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Petrs include a union of 
sheet metal workers in the New York metropolitan area and its 
committee responsible for its apprenticeship program. A 
majority of the union's members have traditionally come up 
through the apprenticeship program, a four-year course designed 
to teach sheet metal skills. A student entering the program is 
indentured, and upon graduation becomes a journeyman. 
This case began in 1971 when the United States filed a 
Title VII suit against petrs to enjoin their pattern and 
practice of discriminating against nonwhites in union 
membership. The district court found that petrs had 
purposefully denied nonwhites membership in the union in 
"- ---- -- ~___..._ --- ---------...._ ------- -
violation of Title VII. Petrs had accomplished this goal 
primarily by blocking the entry of nonwhites into the 
apprenticeship program through the use of invalid entrance 
exams, a requirement that applicants possess a high school 
diploma, and inquiries into applicants' arrest records. The 
district court entered judgment and created an affirmative 
action program (AAP) as a remedy. The petrs were ordered t J 
achieve a nonwhite membership "goal" of 29% by July 1, 1981, 
with interim percentage goals also set. The court appointe a 
special master called an "administrator" to supervise 
compliance with the AAP. 
The CA2 initially affirmed the finding of a Title VII 
violation, but reversed part of the relief granted. On remand, 
the district court entered a revised affirmative action program 
(RAAP) that, inter alia, retained the elements previously 
- 3 -
mentioned. A divided CA2 affirmed. 
In April 1982, the city and state of New York moved to 
have petrs held in contempt for failing to reach the RAAP's 29 % 
goal. The district court granted the motion, but rather than 
base its contempt order directly on failure to meet the goal, 
it based the order on (1) underutilization of the 
apprenticeship program, (2) refusal to conduct an adequate 
publicity campaign, (3) adoption of a job protection plan that 
favored older, and hence white, members, (4) issuance of 
unauthorized work permits to whites from sister unions, and (5) 
failure to maintain and submit records and reports. The court 
determined that these violations of the RAAP thwarted the 
achievement of the goal. The court imposed a fine of $150,000 
to be placed in a training fund to increase nonwhite membership 
in the union's apprenticeship program and ordered the 
administrator to develop a plan for use of the fund. 
In April 1983, New York City again instituted contempt 
proceedings against petrs, this time before the RAAP's 
administrator. The administrator concluded that petrs were in 
contempt of outstanding court orders requiring them to provide 
records of the race and national origin of all applicants for 
union membership. As a remedy, the administrator suggested 
that petrs pay for computerized record keeping and make further 
payments to the training fund that the administrator was 
developing. The district court adopted the administrator's 
recommendations, but deferred setting an amount for the 
training fund contribution until the administrator submitted 
- 4 -
his proposal outlining a plan for the fund. In September 1983, 
the administrator submitted his proposed plan, stating that the 
fund would be used to encourage nonwhite membership in the 
union and be financed by the previous fines and a $.02 per hou r 
labor tax on union members. The district court issued a 
contempt order adopting the administrator's proposal. 
The district court issued still another contempt order in'\ 
September 1983, this time adoptin an amended affirmative 
action program (AAAP) that (1) increased the nonwhite 
membership goal from 29% to 29.23% to be reached by July 31, 
1987, (2) established an apprentice to journeyman ratio of 1:4 ~~ 
( 3) created a three-member apprentice select ion board, ( 4) d~ 
imposed a nonwhite to white ratio of 1:1 for admittance into 
~-~ -------
the apprenticeship program, (5) permitted work on new 
--- -~
procedures to be used after the goal was reached, and (6) 
incorporated the order requiring petrs to pay the costs of 
advisor to monitor the computerization of the records. 
A divided CA2 affirmed all the contempt orders and 
-~
penalties, and sustained the AAAP with minor modifications. 
The CA2 upheld the district court's initial order holding petrs 
in contempt for failure to meet the RAAP's 29% goal because 
four of the five violations of the RAAP that the district court 
found were correct and this provided sufficient basis for the 
order. In particular, the CA2 concluded that, although the 
district court had based its important finding relating to 
underutilization of the apprenticeship program on a 
misunderstanding of the statistics, the finding was supported 
- 5 -
by other sufficient evidence. The CA2 reversed the district 
court's finding that the job protection plan constituted 
contumacious conduct on the ground that the provision had never 
been implemented, but concluded that reversal of this one 
finding did not make the order invalid. 
The CA2 also affirmed the distric~ court's contempt order 
issued for petrs' lack of recordkeeping, concluding that the 
order was supported by clear and convincing evidence showing 
that petrs had not been reasonably diligent in attempting to 
comply with the particular orders of the court and the 
administrator. The CA2 rejected petrs' contention that the 
contempt remedies were punitive and therefore could not be 
imposed except after a criminal proceeding. The court found 
that the fund order was compensatory because its purpose was to 
improve the route of nonwhites to union membership and that it 
was coercive because it would remain in effect until the new 
29.23% goal was achieved. 
The CA2 likewise rejected most of petrs' objections to the 
AAAP established by the September order, holding that the AAAP 
did not violate Title VII or the Constitution. It rejected 
petrs' argument that Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. 
Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), prohibits race-conscious relief 
for Title VII violations "except that [which] benefit[s] 
specifically identified victims of past discrimination." 
Instead, it read Stotts as limiting the scope of race-conscious 
relief only when such relief conflicts with a bona fide 
seniority plan, when "make whole" rather than prospective 
- t> -
relief is involved, and when there has been no finding of 
intentional discrimination. Here, none of these factors was 
present. The appeals court then upheld various changes made by 
the AAAP in pe trs' affirmative action obligation. In 
particular, it~~ufed that the 29.23% nonwhite membership ____, 
objective was not a permanent "quota," but only a temporary and 
~
permissible "goal." The court stated that the g~a_?.. was a 
---·~ 
remedy for past discrimination and added that it "will not 
'----·- ----·
unnecessarily trammel the rights of any readily ascertainable 
group of nonminority individuals." Nevertheless, the court 
struck down that portion of the AAAP that required the 
selection of one nonwhite for every white who enters the 
apprenticeship program. It reasoned that because 45% of petrs' 
indentures in the past had been nonwhite and a selection board 
would oversee the future selection process, the one-for-one 
quota was unnecessary. 
§.ige W~t~ r _9i~~from the court's affirmance of the 
' 
order holding petrs in contempt for failing to meet the RAAP's 
29% goal largely because of the majority's failure "to address 
---......,__... -- ---......._-. ------------~ 
the fact that Local 28 had the approval of the administrator 
-~ -----~--------
for every act it took that affected the number of minority 
----~ 
workers entering the sheet metal industry." The RAAP granted 
the administrator broad discretion to balance the goal of 
increased nonwhite membership with economic constraints. Thus, 
petrs fully complied with the heart of the program. By 
nevertheless imposing sanctions on petrs for failing to meet 
the 29% nonwhite membership goal, the district court 
- 7 -
transformed the "goal" into an inflexible "quota" in violation 
of Title VII and probably the Constitution. Judge Winter 
explained that statistics in the record refuted the district 
court's central finding that the apprenticeship program had 
been underutilized. Because the economics of the sheet metal 
industry had been depressed during the relevant period, the 
"reactive finger pointing at Local 28 is a faintly camouflaged 
holding that journeymen should have been replaced by minority 
apprentices on a strictly racial basis." He argued that such a 
requirement "is at odds with [Stotts], which iejected such a 
use of racial preference as a remedy under Title VII." Judge 
Winter also dissented from the order establishing a training 
fund on the ground that factual findings establishing a need 
for such a fund had not been made. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs first contend that imposition of 
the RAAP and AAAP exceeded the district court's remedial powers 
granted by Title VII because the programs either did or do 
impose a race-conscious quota broader than is necessary to 
remedy the effects of past discrimination to actual victims. 
They argue that the CA2's reading of Stotts was unfairly 
narrow, but that, if not, the Court should grant cert to 
determine the permissible breadth of coercive race-conscious 
remedies for Title VII violations. Petrs also contend that the 
district court's order adopting the AAAP violated the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment by requiring petrs 
to enroll nonwhites in the apprenticeship program who are not 
identifiable victims of the union's past discrimination. 
I 
- 8 -
Furthermore, the CA2's construction of Title VII as allowing 
the district court to impose the AAAP on petrs transforms Title 
VII into an unconstitutional bill of attainder on the heirs of 
the persons attainted in violation of the constitutional 
provision prohibiting the practice of "corruption of blood." 
See u.s. Const. art. I, §9, cl. 3. Petrs cite County of Oneida 
v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S. Ct. 1245, 1275 (1985) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) ("The Framers recognized that no one ought to be 
condemned for his forefathers misdeeds."), as an example of the 
Court's repeated objection to such discriminatory legislation. 
Petrs also argue that the contempt sanctions violate due 
process because they are punitive rather than compensatory or 
designed to compel compliance with prior court orders. Due 
process allows such sanctions only in the context of criminal 
proceedings. Furthermore, petrs argue that the CA2 should have 
reversed the district court simply because it erroneously 
interpreted the statistical study of the apprenticeship program 
as implying that the program had been underutilized while the 
RAAP was in effect. Finally, they argue that the use of a 
special master to administer the affirmative action program 
violates the union's right to self-governance, which is 
protected by §40l(a) of the LMRA. 
Resps, city and state of New York, argue that petrs' 
appeal should be dismissed as an untimely challenge to the 
initial 1971 determination of a Title VII violation and 
imposition of the RAAP. They also argue that the contempt 
orders were appropriately compensatory and coercive rather than 
- ~ -
punitive. They further argue that the CA2's distinction of 
Stotts is correct, the imposition of a race-conscious program 
is an appropriate remedy, and there is no split in the circuits 
that needs to be resolved. Finally, they contend that the AAAP 
and funding order are narrowly tailored to serve the compelling 
goal of eradicating proven systematic discrimination. 
On behalf of resp EEOC, the SG argues that petrs' only 
~
issue meriting review is the one "relating to the failure to 
abide by racial quotas contained in [the RAAP] as a proper _______._, ...._....-.----
basis for a finding of contempt, as well as the imposition of 
such quotas as part of the remedial scheme of the [AAAP] ." The 
other issues are highly fact-bound and therefore inappropriate 
for review. The SG argues that even the meritorious issues in 
this case are not optimal candidates for cert because they are 
inextricably interwoven with the other fact-bound issues and 
because the issue is presented in a far clearer form in Local 
No. 93, International Association of Firefighters v. City of 
Cleveland, cert. pending, No. 84-1999, in which the United 
States, as amicus curiae, has urged the Court to grant cert. 
The SG admits that the AAAP's 29.23% "goal" is really a "quota" 
because "fines that will threaten [petrs'] very existence" have 
been threatened if it is not met. But the question is 
unnecessarily complicated because it is unclear the extent to 
which the quota was imposed to remedy prior Title VII 
violations or instead as an exercise of the district court's 
contempt power. In addition, the Court will likely consider 
the validity of racial quotas under the Fourteenth Amendment 
- lU - ' 
granted, No. 84-1340. Thus, the SG requests that cert be 
granted in the City of Cleveland case, and that this case be 
held pending its disposition and that of Wygant. 
In a reply to the SG, petrs argue that neither the City of 
Cleveland case nor Wygant will resolve the issue presented here 
because both involve "voluntary" consent decrees instead of 
court-imposed remedies, and Wygant involves the Fourteenth 
-- h 
/~~ Amendment instead of Title VII. 
4. DISCUSSION: In United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 
193 (1979), the Court held that Title VII leaves private 
employers and unions free to take voluntary race-conscious 
steps to eliminate "manifest racial imbalances in traditionally 
segregated job categories." But Weber began its analysis by 
stating: 
We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of our inquiry. 
• • • [S] ince the Kaiser-USWA plan was ado ted vo u t ril , we 
are not concerned with what Title VII requires or with what a 
court might order to remedy a past proved- violation of the Act. 
~, at 200. This case squarely presents the issue left open 
in Weber. 
~
The CA2 concluded that Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 
v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), did not decide the issue 
presented in this case. Indeed, Stotts touched upon, but did 
not fully address, the limits of Title VII's grant of remedial 
powers. In Stotts, the Court struck down an order enjoining a 
public employer, which was subject to an affirmative action 
- LL -
plan adopted pursuant to a consent decree, from following its 
seniority system in determining lay-offs. The Court held that 
the injunction could not be justified as an effort to enforce 
the consent decree because neither the decree's express terms 
nor its purpose envisioned overriding the seniority system. 
The Court also rejected the argument that the injunction was a 
valid modification of the consent decree, reasoning that 
neither Title VII's voluntary settlement policy nor its 
potential remedial power could justify such a theory. The 
Court reasoned that the potential power argument was not 
consistent with cases requiring a close nexus between the 
remedy of competitive seniority and actual victimization from 
past discrimination, nor with Title VII's policy of providing 
"make-whole relief only to those who have been actual victims 
of illegal discrimination." 
Rather than explore the limits on Title VII's remedial 
power as suggested by Stotts, the CA2 chose to confine Stotts 
to a rather small category of cases and to affirm the case 
based on its prior decision in EEOC v. Local 638, 532 F.2d 821, 
828 (CA2 1976) (race-conscious goals permissible to remedy past 
discrimination if reverse discrimination effect is concentrated 
on relatively small group of nonminorities), cert. denied, 429 
u.s. 823 (1976). Each circuit that !has addressed a Title VII 
challenge to affirmative action programs since Stotts has read 
Stotts equally narrowly. See, e.g., Deveraux v. Geary, No. 83-
1345, slip op., at 17-18 (CAl June 24, 1985); Turner v. Orr, 
759 F.2d 817, 823-26 (CAll 1985) (distinguishing Stotts and 
- 1:.:! -
extending Weber to consent decree programs); City of Cleveland, 
753 F.2d, at 485-93 (CA6), cert. pending. The acceptability 
and permissible scope of court-imposed affirmative action 
remedies under Title VII is a question of great public 
importance and one whose answer need not await an intercircuit 
split. The question has already been extensively debated in 
the public fora, and thus the benefit of further percolation 
will be negligible. Moreover, this case involves the 
imposition of rigid goals or quotas, and this Court has 
-- '-- ;::::>; -indicated that quotas are unacceptable remedies for Title VII 
violations. Stotts, 104 s. Ct., at 2589. See also University 
of California v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 288-89 (racial quotas 
violate Fourteenth Amendment whether labeled "quotas" or 
"goals") • 
Although the Court should seriously consider the SG's 
suggestion of granting cert in the City of Cleveland case and 
holding this case for it, the SG presents no sufficient reason 
for refusing to grant cert in this case if cert is denied in 
the City of Cleveland case. The City of Cleveland case does 
present its Title VII issue more cleanly than this case does. 
But the Title VII issues in each case are not identical because 
City of Cleveland involves whether a public employer may adopt 
racial quotas pursuant to a consent decree. It is unclear 
whether Title VII imposes the same limitations, if any, on 
quasi-voluntary affirmative action by public employers as it 
does on court-imposed affirmative action by private unions. 
Furthermore, the fact that the case is complicated by a 
- ~J -
possible difference between Title VII remedial powers in the 
first instance and contempt powers to enforce an existing 
affirmative action plan or to impose a new plan does not make 
the case uncertworthy. Numerous cases involving existing 
affirmative action plans may arise under these circumstances. 
Finally, the case can be made far less complicated by limiting 
review to the Title VII issue rather than extending it to the 
unpersuasive equal protection and due process issues or the 
other issues involved in the case below, which are overly fact-
bound. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend grant. 
There are two responses and a reply. 
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